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ABSTRACT
Backdoor attacks against CNNs represent a new threat against deep
learning systems, due to the possibility of corrupting the training
set so to induce an incorrect behaviour at test time. To avoid
that the trainer recognises the presence of the corrupted samples,
the corruption of the training set must be as stealthy as possible.
Previous works have focused on the stealthiness of the perturbation
injected into the training samples, however they all assume that the
labels of the corrupted samples are also poisoned. This greatly
reduces the stealthiness of the attack, since samples whose content
does not agree with the label can be identified by visual inspection
of the training set or by running a pre-classification step. In this
paper we present a new backdoor attack without label poisoning
Since the attack works by corrupting only samples of the target
class, it has the additional advantage that it does not need to identify
beforehand the class of the samples to be attacked at test time.
Results obtained on the MNIST digits recognition task and the
traffic signs classification task show that backdoor attacks without
label poisoning are indeed possible, thus raising a new alarm
regarding the use of deep learning in security-critical applications.
Index Terms— Adversarial learning, security of deep learning,
backdoor poisoning attacks, training with poisoned data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning methods are successfully used in a huge variety
of classification tasks. The security of such techniques is however
questionable, thus affecting their applicability to security-related
applications (e.g., biometric authentication, multimedia forensics
. . . ) or any application involving critical infrastructures (e.g., au-
tonomous driving, electrical grid,. . . ). Recently, a new class of
attacks against deep learning architectures, known as backdoor
attacks, has been proposed, where the attacker’s aim is to create a
backdoor into the system, so to ease inducing a classification error,
or any other desired behavior, at test time [1]. This is done either
by directly manipulating the network parameters, as in [2]), or by
poisoning the training set. Early poisoning attacks to the training
set aimed at generic misclassification [3], [4]; more recently, attacks
have been proposed that focus on target misclassification [5], [6].
In this second case, which is the case we focus on in this paper,
the attacked classifier, i.e., the classifier trained on the poisoned set,
will misclassify the backdoor instances by assigning them a target
label specified by the attacker. Most backdoor attacks assume that
the model is fully or partially known to the attacker and under
its control up to some extent [1], [2], [6], [7]. A more realistic
black-box training poisoning, where the attacker has no knowledge
of the model, is considered in [5], and also in [6]. The targeted
backdoor attacks considered so far assume that the attacker corrupts
a percentage of samples in the training set by injecting a so called
backdoor signal or patter and assigning them the target label. As a
consequence, the labels of the poisoned samples are also corrupted
by the attacker. In this way the stealthiness of the attack is put
at risk. Backdoor samples, in fact, can be easily revealed by the
trainer, and then ruled out, by inspecting the dataset (no matter if
the backdoor pattern introduced by the attacker is visible or not).
In this paper, we propose a new kind of backdoor attack which
does not require that the attacker poisons the labels of the corrupted
samples. Given a classifier in charge of distinguishing samples
drawn from c different classes, the goal of the attacker is to induce
the classifier to decide for a target class t even when the test sample
belongs to a different class. To do so, the attacker corrupts a certain
number of training samples of the target class t by adding to them
a backdoor signal v. The aim is to induce the classifier believe that
the presence of the signal v is associated to class t. At test time,
the attacker adds to a sample belonging to a different class l the
backdoor signal v. Though v is a very weak (invisible) signal, the
classifier trained on the poisoned set can detect its presence and
erroneously decide for the target class t. Of course, the classifier
should continue working as expected on samples which do not
contain the backdoor patter v. This way of operating should be
contrasted to the backdoor attack proposed so far, wherein the
attacker takes a sample (x, l) from a test (source) class l and
corrupts it into (x+v, t), where v is the backdoor signal, and t the
target class. In addition, the new attack has the further advantage
of working only on samples belonging to the target class, so that,
at test time, the attack can be applied to samples belonging to any
class. This also means that the design of the signal v depends only
on the target class i, while in previous cases v should be adapted
to both the source and the target classes. In principle, this makes
it possible to design an attack that turns samples from any class
to any other class by designing c different backdoor signals and
using them to corrupt a fraction of training samples belonging to
the different classes. To the best of our knowledge, the only work
considering a backdoor attack without label poisoning is [?], where,
however, the goal of the attacker is different, since in that work it
is required that samples of the target class without the backdoor
are also misclassified.
Though attractive, creating such a backdoor attack is a hard
task, since it is difficult to convince the network to rely on the
backdoor signal to classify samples belonging to the target class.
In the presence of poisoned labels, this result is achieved more
easily, since the network has no other way to distinguish samples
belonging to the same class but labeled differently than relying
on the backdoor pattern. We will show that creating a backdoor
without poisoning the sample labels is indeed possible, the price to
pay being the necessity of corrupting a larger fraction of training
samples. We will do so by presenting a backdoor attack against the
MNIST digits recognition task. We also run some tests in the more
realistic scenario of classification of traffic signs images.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. in Sect. II, we give
a rigorous formulation of the new backdoor attack. In Sect. III we
present two possible implementations of the attack focusing on two
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different classification tasks. In Sect. IV, we show the results of the
experimental analysis we carried out, proving the effectiveness of
the proposed attacks. Finally, in Sect. V, we draw some conclusions
and highlight some directions for future work.
II. BACKDOOR ATTACK FORMULATION
In this section, we provide a rigorous general formulation of the
new backdoor attack introduced in this paper.
II-A. Attcker’s model
Attacker’s goal: the attacker aims at creating a backdoor signal
and injecting it into the samples of a target class (or multiple back-
door signals in the case of multiple target classes) so that when, at
test time, the input to the network contains the backdoor signal, the
network recognises it as an instance of the target class. At the same
time, the attack should not affect the performance of the model with
respect to uncorrupted samples. Moreover, it is important that the
backdoor signal is imperceptible or hardly perceptible so to avoid
that its presence is revealed through inspection of the training set.
Attacker’s knowledge: the attacker has no knowledge of the
CNN model (as in [5] and [6] for the case of static perturbations).
Attacker’s capability: the attacker has access only to a portion
α of the training samples (of the target class). The attacker can
not change the labels of the corrupted samples 1. We anticipate
the necessity that the attacker finds a suitable tradeoff between the
percentage α of attacked samples (to relax the capabilities required
for the attack) and the strength of the backdoor signal, which should
be kept as weak as possible to ensure the stealthiness of the attack.
II-B. Attack formalization
Let f(·) be the CNN model decision function and D =
{(xi, yi), i = 1, ...., n} be the set of n pristine samples used
for training. We denote with Dl the set of training samples
(xi, yi) belonging to the class with label l, i.e., such that yi = l
(l = 1, ...., c, where c is the total number of classes); hence,
D = D1 ∪D2... ∪Dc. Let t be the target class, that is, the class
corrupted by the attacker, t ∈ {1, .., c}. The attack consists in the
application of a stealthy perturbation, also referred to as backdoor
signal, to a fraction α of samples in Dt. In the following, we
indicate with Dbt the set with the corrupted samples. In this paper,
we consider additive perturbations to the image domain. Given a
pristine image xi ∈ Dt, the backdoor attacked sample is built as
xbi = xi+v, where v is the backdoor signal. Then, after poisoning,
sample (xi, t) is replaced with (xbi , t). The model is then trained on
the poisoned dataset Db, which is the same dataset as D with Dt
replaced by Dbt . The attack is successful if adding the backdoor
signal into the samples of another class at test time results in
the classification of the attacked sample as belonging to class t.
Formally, the attack is successful if, given a test sample (x, y)
with y 6= t, we have f(x+ v) = t.
The fraction α of class samples corrupted by the attacker plays a
crucial role. If α is too small, the network will not see the backdoor
signal; on the other hand, if α is too large, the network will rely
too much on the backdoor signal and will not capture the real
discriminative features of class t, thus impairing the performance
of the network in the absence of attacks. In other words, in order to
make the attack work properly, the presence of the backdoor signal
1In fact the attacker has no interest in changing the labels of the corrupted
samples, to avoid that such samples are detected and ruled out.
should be regarded to by the network as a sufficient condition to
decide in favour of the target class, but not as a necessary one.2
It is also possible to consider a case in which the attacker has
two target classes, t1 and t2. In this case, the attacker defines two
backdoor signals v1 and v2 and adds them to a fraction α of samples
from the two classes as before. Then, at test time, given (x, y) with
y = l 6= t1, t2, the successfully attacked network should produce
the following outputs: f(x + v1) = t1 and f(x + v2) = t2. The
extension to the case of multiple target classes is immediate.
III. METHODOLOGY
We considered two popular recognition tasks, namely the MNIST
digit recognition task [8] and the traffic signs classification task [9].
Datasets: for the digits recognition task, we considered the
MNIST dataset [8] consisting of 28 × 28 grayscale handwritten
digit images from 10 classes (digit {0...9}). The number of images
is about 6000 per class for training, 1000 per class for testing.
For the experiments of traffic signs classification, we considered
16 different classes (corresponding to the most populated classes)
from the German Traffic Sign (GTSRB) benchmark dataset [10];
the 16 classes consist of 6 speed limit signs, 3 prohibition signs,
3 danger signs and 4 mandatory signs. The color images of the
original raw dataset are resized to 32 × 32 × 3. Around 16000
images are considered for training (about 1000 per class) and 7200
for testing (about 450 per class).
Attacked networks: we describe the CNN architectures used in
our experiments. The network for the MNIST digits recognition
task is structured as follows: 2 convolutional layers with 32 filters
followed by a max pooling; 2 convolutional layers with 64 filters
followed by a max pooling; 2 fully connected layers with 512
neurons (dropout 0.2) and 10 neurons respectively. A final softmax
is performed. For all the convolutional layers, the kernel size is set
3×3 with stride 1 (and relu activation), while for the max pooling
the kernel size is 2× 2, with stride 1. At each convolutional layer
output, batch normalization is performed. The network is trained
on 20 epochs, the batch size for training is set to 64 images. 0.99
of accuracy in absence of attacks is achieved by this network.
Traffic signs classification is performed using standard LeNet-5
[8]. The network is run over 100 epochs, with batch size 64. An
accuracy of about 0.98 is reached without attacks.
In both cases, the Adam solver is used with learning rate 10−3
and momentum 0.99. Model training and testing, and also the
backward attack procedure, are implemented in Python via the
Keras API. Standard Keras data augmentation is performed to the
images in the training set.
Backdoor signals: the design of the backdoor signal requires
particular attention, since, in general, its form should depend on
the specific classification task and also on the target class. On one
hand the signal should be easily detectable when mixed with the
true samples, on the other hand, it should be weal enough to ensure
the stealthiness of the attack. It is also important that the presence
of the backdoor signal in a small but significant fraction of the
training samples, does not impair the training process, since the
network will have to work normally on non-.attacked samples. In
other words, the backdoor signal should be detectable in the same
2This is different from [?], where the presence of the backdoor signal is
both necessary and sufficient to decide for the target class, thus easing the
attack.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 1. Example of MNIST digit image without (a) and with (b)
backdoor signal created by letting ∆ = 40. Example of GTSRB
traffic sign image (c) and the same image with a superimposed
sinusoidal backdoor signal with ∆ = 20 and f = 6 (d).
(or similar) feature space used by the network to classify the pristine
samples.
With the above ideas in mind, for the digit classification task
we considered a ramp signal defined as v(i, j) = j∆/m, 1 ≤
j ≤ m, 1 ≤ i ≤ l, where m is the number of columns of the
image and l the number of rows. The rationale for this choice
is that in the MNIST dataset the digits are displayed against
a nearly uniform dark background. Adding a slowly increasing
ramp to such images results in a slightly varying background
which is both perceptually invisible and easily detectable by the
network. An example of a digit image with the superimposed
backdoor signal with ∆ = 40 is shown in Figure 1(b). As we
can see, the stealthiness is guaranteed for such value of ∆. The
triangle signal, defined as v(i, j) = j∆/m, 1 ≤ j ≤ m/2, and
v(i, j) = (m − j)∆/m, m/2 < j ≤ m, 1 ≤ i ≤ l, is also
used in our tests. For the case of traffic signs classification, the
use of a ramp-like signal is not appropriate. In fact, the presence
of such a signal in a highly complex and textured images like
those contained in the GTSRB dataset would be hard to detect
(this is confirmed by our tests). For this reason, we opted for an
horizontal sinusoidal signal defined by v(i, j) = ∆ sin(2pijf/m),
1 ≤ j ≤ m, 1 ≤ i ≤ l, for a certain frequency f . A traffic sign
image with a sinusoidal backdoor signal superimposed is shown
in Figure 4(d), where we let ∆ = 20 and f = 6. The overlay
backdooor signal is applied on all the channels. In this case, the
backdoor is almost, thought not perfectly, invisible. More suitable
choices for the signal, e.g. local perturbations, could be investigated
in this case. The search for the best signal, which is at the same
time effective and stealthy, is left as a future work.
During testing, the attack can be carried out by applying a
backdoor signal with the same or a larger strength ∆. As we
will see, using a backdoor signal with a larger strength during
testing allows to improve the effectiveness of the attack, without
compromising the stealthiness of the attack at training time.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we report the results we have got by attacking the
MNIST and traffic sign classification networks.
IV-A. MNIST classification
We first exemplify the entire process and give a first snapshot of
the effectiveness of the proposed attack. Let digit ’3’ be the target
class of the attack. To implement the attack, the ramp backdoor
signal is superimposed to a fraction α = 0.3 of the digit ’3’
samples in D3 with strength ∆tr = 30. At test time the same
ramp is added to the samples of all the other classes, the goal being
inducing the network to decide for all ’3’ even in the presence of
Fig. 2. Accuracy (%) of the network for MNIST classification
trained under a backdoor attack (α = 0.3, ∆tr = 30), in the
absence of attacks at test time (a), in the presence of backdoor
attack with ∆ts = 30 (b), ∆ts = 40 (c) and ∆ts = 60 (d).
Table I. Attack success rate (%) in the case of MNIST classification
for several values of α and ∆ts (∆tr = 30), for different target
digits t. The rate is averaged over all the test digits.
t = ‘2’ t = ‘4’ t = ‘7’ t = ‘9’
α/∆ts 30 40 60 80 30 40 60 80 30 40 60 80 30 40 60 80
0.2 77 83 91 93 23 27 34 44 28 35 45 55 67 75 86 89
0.3 71 79 88 92 67 75 86 90 49 61 77 87 73 79 88 92
0.4 85 91 96 97 69 77 88 92 70 77 86 90 91 95 99 99
other digits. Figure 2(a) shows the classification accuracy at test
time of the network trained with the backdoor. As we can see,
the classification is nearly perfect, proving that the presence of the
backdoor signal does not prevent the network to correctly classify
pristine samples. The classification results obtained in the presence
of the backdoor signal are reported in Figure 2(b). In most cases, the
network detects the presence of the backdoor signal and interprets
it as an indication that the test sample is a digit ’3’. The attack is
even more successful if a stronger backdoor signal is used at test
time, as depicted in Figure 2(c) and (d), where we let ∆ts = 40 and
60. To evaluate the dependency of the accuracy of the attack on the
percentage α of corrupted samples, we carried out more extensive
experiments whose results are summarised in Table I, reporting the
probability that a test sample with a superimposed backdoor signal
is classified as the target digit t, for several ∆ts. The probability
is averaged over all the test digits (except t). Results are reported
for the target digit ’2’,’4’,’7’ and ’9’. In all the cases, even when
α = 0.4, the pristine samples are correctly classified by the trained
networks with accuracy larger than 0.97. From the table, we see that
the success rate of the attack generally improves by increasing α.
Also, the attack is successful with very large probability in most
cases when ∆ts = 40 and 60. The effectiveness of the attack
can be further improved by considering ∆tr = 40 (which still
guarantee the stealthiness of the attack). When α < 0.2, the attack
performance rapidly decreases. Therefore, the fraction of to-be-
corrupted samples for a successful attack is much larger for the
Fig. 3. Accuracy (%) of the network trained under a two-target
backdoor attack with t1 = 5 and t2 = 9 (α = 0.4 and ∆tr = 30).
proposed attack with respect to the standard backdoor attack with
label poisoning (the attack is successful by injecting just 1-4% of
corrupted samples [6]).
We also run some tests by considering a two-target attack.
Figure 3 reports the results we have got when the network is trained
under a backdoor attack with target digits t1 = ’5’ and t2 = 9,
corrupted with a ramp and a triangle signal respectively. Both D5
and D7 are attacked with α = 30 and ∆tr = 30. In particular, the
figure reports the test accuracy when a ramp backdoor (left) and a
triangle backdoor (right) is added to the test digits with ∆ts = 30
(we checked that pristine samples are still correctly classified). As
we can see, the probability that the networks decides, respectively,
for ’5’ and ’9’, is rather large. A bit of confusion is made between
these two digits when the ramp signal is added (perhaps also due
to the similarity of ramp and triangle signal). These results are
promising, showing that a multiple-target attack is also possible.
IV-B. Traffic Signs classification
Similar tests were carried out for the case of traffic sign classi-
fication. Figure 4 reports the results we have obtained by letting
the target class be the speed limit 50 sign. The attack has been
implemented by letting α = 0.2, ∆tr = 20 and f = 6. Figure
4 shows the classification accuracy in the absence of attacks at
test time (left), and when the backdoor signal with ∆ts = 30 is
added to test samples from all the classes (right). We see that,
when the sinusoidal backdoor signal is superimposed, the network
classifies several signs from different classes as the speed limit 50
sign with pretty high probability. Not surprisingly, the speed limit
signs (corresponding to label 0 to 5 in the figure) are generally
easier to attack. The results of more extensive tests are reported
in Table II where we show the probability that a test sample with
a superimposed backdoor signal is classified as the target traffic
sign for several strengths of the superimposed signal ∆ts. The
probability is averaged over the 7 most successfully attacked classes
(different from t). The results are reported for 4 different target
signs, corresponding to 2 speed limits (t = 1 and 3), 1 prohibition
sign (t = 7) and 1 danger sign (t = 13). In each case, the network
is trained by letting α = 0.2, ∆tr = 20. The pristine samples
are correctly classified (the accuracy is always larger than 0.95 for
every class). Upon inspection of the table, we see that the network
learns the backdoor signal; however, in order to be regarded to
as a discriminant feature (and induce the network to change the
decision), in many cases, the backdoor has to be superimposed
with a rather large strength at test time. We also verified that,
by increasing α, the attack performance does not improve much
and the classification accuracies remains similar. Obviously, the
Fig. 4. Accuracy (%) of the traffic sign classification network
trained under a backdoor attack (α = 0.2, ∆ = 20, f = 6), in the
absence of attacks at test time (a), in the presence of a backdoor
attack with ∆ts = 30 (b).
Table II. Attack success rate (%) in the case of traffic sign
classification for several ∆ts (α = 0.2, ∆tr = 20, f = 6). The
rate is averaged on the 7 most successfully attacked test signs.
t = 1 t = 3 t = 7 t = 13
∆ts 20 30 40 60 20 30 40 60 20 30 40 60 20 30 40 60
% 73 81 79 83 39 62 76 87 52 71 83 93 26 48 60 78
effectiveness of the attack can be improved by increasing ∆tr , at
the price of a reduced stealthiness.
We also trained the network for traffic signs classification with a
two-target backdoor attack. When the target classes are t1 = 1 and
t2 = 7, and a sinusoidal backdoor signal is considered at frequency
f = 6 and f = 3 respectively (with both D1 and D7 attacked with
α = 0.2 and ∆tr = 20), the attack success rate (averaged on the 7
best results) is 80% for t1 and 56% for t2 when ∆ts = 40, 90%
for t1 and 67% for t2 when ∆ts = 60.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have proposed a new backdoor attack which, as opposed to
previous works, does not require that the labels of the corrupted
samples are poisoned. In this way, the stealthiness of the attack is
greatly improved, since the presence of corrupted training samples
can not be revealed by detecting the mismatch between the sample
content and its label. The flexibility of the attack is also improved,
since at training time the attacker needs only to corrupt samples
of the target class, while the choice of the source class can be
made at test time. The price to pay with respect to attacks with
label corruption is that the percentage of samples that must be
corrupted is an order of magnitude larger. We have implemented
the new attack by considering two popular classification tasks,
namely digit recognition and traffic sign classification. In the case
of digit recognition task, we were able to successfully attack the
classification networks, while keeping the backdoor signal invisible.
For the traffic sign case, the attack is more difficult; however, our
results show that the attack without label poisoning is is effective
to some extent with a nearly invisible backdoor. Especially in this
case, the choice of a proper backdoor signal is of great importance.
Future works will then focus on a better adaptation of the backdoor
signal to the classification task and the target class of the attack,
with the aim of reducing the strength of the backdoor signal itself
and the percentage of corrupted signals required for a successful
attack. It goes without saying that devising proper mechanisms to
identify the presence of backdoors into a trained model is of the
outmost importance and is going to receive an increasing attention
in the next years.
* The list of authors is provided in alphabetic order.
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